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Models  with  a  continuum  of consumers  and  locations  such  that  each  consumer 
can  purchase  goods  in  only  one  location  are  examined.  Such  models  are  common 
in  the  literature  of the  new  urban  economics.  An  approximation  by economies  with 
a finite  number  of consumers  is  shown  to  fail. In  the  first  two  examples,  the  con- 
tinuum  economy  equilibrium  exists and  is unique,  but  the  finite  economy has many 
equilibria  (Example  1)  or  none  at  all  (Example  2).  In  Example  3, the  continuum 
economy has no  equilibrium,  but  the  finite  economy has one. These  three  examples 
employ  location-dependent  utilities.  The  fourth  example  illustrates  the  conceptual 
difficulties  that  arise  in  approximation  when  transportation  cost  is  introduced, 
even  with  location-independent  utilities.  The  results  are  related  to  the  literatures 
concerning  product  digerentiation  and  spatial  economies.  Journal  of  Economic 
Liferature  Classitication  Numbers:  930,  021.  G  1991  Academic  PESS,  Inc. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Models  with  a  continuum  of  agents,  a  continuum  of  goods,  or  both, 
have  been  used  by  economists  for  some  time.  Examples  are  Bewley  [9], 
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Hildenbrand  [ 151,  Mas-Cole11  [20],  and  Jones  [ 16, 171,  although  this  list 
does  not  contain  a  fraction  of  the  literature.  The  reasons  for  using  such 
models  include  mathematical  ease  and  the  means  to  make  precise  the 
hypotheses  of perfect  competition.  Models  with  a continuum  of consumers 
are  generally  justified  by  demonstrating  that  they  are close  in  terms  of equi- 
libria,  comparative  statics,  and  welfare  properties  to  models  with  a  large 
but  finite  number  of  consumers,  those  models  that  one  might  believe  are 
closer  to  reality.  In  this  way,  the  mathematical  simplicity  of the  continuum 
model  prevails  and  one  can  speak  of  a  pure  or  ideal  form  of  perfect 
competition. 
The  focus  of this  paper  is on  a class of continuum  models  specialized  to 
the  particular  needs  of  urban  economics  and  regional  science  in  general. 
The  class  also  includes  some  models  used  for  local  public  goods  and  dif- 
ferentiated  products.  Since  the  classics  of Alonso  [l]  and  Beckmann  [3], 
urban  economists  and  regional  scientists  have  employed  models  with  a 
continuum  of  agents  distributed  over  a  continuum  of  locations  or  land. 
Two  goods  are  consumed  by  each  consumer:  land  (a  differentiated  com- 
modity)  and  a  mobile  composite  consumption  good  that  is  taken  to  be 
numeraire.  Each  consumer  is  required  to  reside  and  consume  goods  in 
exactly  one  location  (see Wheaton  [29]).  These  models  have  been  shown 
to  be  tractable  in  that  they  circumvent  mathematical  complications  iden- 
tified  by  ten  Raa  and  Berliant  [25].  They  have  empirical  uses  and  also 
applications  to  the  local  public  goods  literature  (see  Brueckner  [lo]). 
However,  Berliant  [6]  shows  that  the  standard  justification  for  models 
with  a continuum  of consumers  (given  above)  does  not  apply  to  this  class 
of location  models.  In  particular,  a continuum  of consumers  each  holding 
a positive  area  of land  in  a Euclidan  space is impossible.  Furthermore,  any 
sequence  of  economies  with  a  finite  number  of  consumers  tending  to  a 
limiting  economy  with  a  continuum  of  agents  has  the  property  that  the 
land  holdings  and  endowments  of consumers  must  tend  to  zero  on  average. 
Consequently,  the  utility  derived  by  a consumer  from  any  positive  area  of 
land  must  be  infinite  in  the  continuum  economy,  as consumers  own  den- 
sities,  This  contrasts  with  the  Hildenbrand  [15]  story,  which  is  used  for 
models  without  location,  where  average  endowments  and  consumption  are 
positive,  but  the fraction  of total  commodities  consumed  by  an  agent  tends 
to  zero.  Thus,  these  particular  continuum  location  models  have  the 
property  that  they  are  not  approximates,  in  the  usual  sense, to  reasonable, 
large,  finite  economies.  Under  this  approximation,  the  equilibria  and 
comparative  statics  of the  continuum  economy  can  be vastly  different  from 
those  of finite  economies. 
The  purpose  of this  paper  is to  examine  another  possible  approximation 
or  interpretation  of  this  class  of continuum  location  models  suggested  in 
the  urban  economics  literature  and  by  Aumann  [2].  A continuum  of iden- CONTINUUM  LOCATION  MODELS  97 
tical  consumers  (of measure  1, say)  of the  continuum  economy  is  assumed 
to  represent  directly  the  behavior  of  one  large  consumer  of  an  economy 
with  a finite  number  of consumers.  That  is,  each  consumer  of an  economy 
with  a finite  population  is represented  by  a continuum  of infinitesimal  par- 
ticles.  Thus,  we examine  whether  location  economies  with  a continuum  of 
consumers,  whose  total  mass  represents  a  finite  number  of  agents,  and 
economies  with  a  direct  representation  of finitely  many  agents  are  similar. 
Two  notions  of similarity  are employed.  The  economies  are strongly  similar 
if  demands  are  equal;  they  are  weakly  similar  if  equilibria  are  equal. 
Equality  of demand  requires  that  the  demand  mappings  have  equal  values 
for  all  prices.  Equality  of equilibria  requires  that  the  mappings  have  equal 
values  at  equilibrium  prices  only.  Since  the  main  result  of  this  paper  is 
negative,  the  emphasis  wil  be  on  weak  similarity  in  order  to  strengthen  the 
conclusions. 
The  results  detailed  below  show that  it  is  possible  to  find  equilibrium 
prices  of a  continuum  model  that  do  not  clear  the  markets  of  analogous 
finite  models,  and  there  are equilibrium  prices  of a finite  model  that  do  not 
clear  the  markets  of an  analogous  continuum  model.  Thus,  the  models  are 
not  weakly  similar.  The  particular  examples  are  simple  (e.g.,  linear  or 
Leontief  preferences)  and  they  seem  robust.  As  a  by-product  of  this 
research,  examples  of continuum  economies  with  identical  individuals  and 
well-behaved  preferences  but  no  equilibrium  were  found.  Thus,  the  first 
order  conditions  for  the  continuum  model  can  be different  from  those  of an 
analogous  finite  model,  and  they  can  also  be  vacuous.  In  a  companion 
paper,  Berliant,  Papageorgiou,  and  Wang  [7]  have counterexamples  to  the 
first  and  second  welfare  theorems  for  a  similar  continuum  model.  Hence, 
the  continuum  model  of location  theory  does  not  possess the  properties  of 
many  neoclassical  models.  For  a  location  model  with  a  finite  number  of 
consumers  that  does  possess these  properties,  see Berliant  [6]. 
The  paper  most  closely  related  to  ours  is  Papageorgiou  and  Pines  [23], 
which  seems  to  have  been  developed  in  reaction  to  some  of our  examples. 
It  is important  to  be precise  about  how our  work  is related  to  theirs  for  the 
sake  of clarity.  Their  “BRIDGE”  linking  the  continuum  and  finite  models 
corresponds  directly  to  one  of  the  links  examined  here,  the  link  called 
egalitarian  utility  below.  Under  the  assumptions  that  all  consumers  are 
identical  and  that  equilibrium  exists  in  both  the  continuum  and  corre- 
sponding  (“BRIDGED”)  finite  models,  Papageorgiou  and  Pines  show that 
the  equilibria  are  the  same  in  the  two  models.  They  embed  transportation 
cost  in  the  utility  function,  so  that  utility  is location  dependent.  Our  first 
three  examples  employ  location-dependent  utility,  while  the  fourth  has  an 
explicit  transportation  cost  function. 
Our  examples  below  show that  the  class of location  economies  covered 
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egalitarian  “BRIDGE,”  is  quite  small.  The  first  assumption,  that  all  con- 
sumers  are  identical,  clearly  limits  the  result  to  a  very  small  class  of 
economies  by  itself.  If  there  is more  than  one  type  of consumer  (even  two 
types),  Examples  1  and  4  below  show that  the  result  is  no  longer  valid. 
Examples  2 and  3 show that  the  result  can  fail  if there  is no  equilibrium  for 
the  continuum  model  or  no  equilibrium  for  the  finite  model,  respectively. 
As the  literature  on  the  existence  of equilibrium  for  these two  models  is not 
well-developed,  the  size  of  the  class  of  continuum  economies  such  that 
equilibrium  exists  and  such  that  the  corresponding  finite  economy  has  an 
equilibrium  is  unclear.  The  examples  suggest  that  the  complement  of  this 
class  is far  from  empty. 
Two  papers  of the  urban  economics  literature  related  to  ours  are  Fujita 
and  Smith  [12]  and  Scotchmer  [27].  These  papers  demonstrate  the 
existence  of  an  equilibrium  for  location  models  with  a  continuum  of 
consumers  and  continuum  and  finite  number  of  locations,  respectively. 
Fujita  and  Smith  consider  an  open  model  in  which  land  is initially  owned 
by  nobody  and  rents  exit  the  system.  Conditions  are  imposed  on  both 
preferences  and  demand,  while  location  cannot  enter  into  a  consumer’s 
utility.  In  the  urban  literature,  location  usually  enters  into  the  utility 
function  to  account  for  the  disutility  of travel  to  work  (see Wheaton  [28]). 
We  shall  return  to  this  in  the  conclusion.  Scotchmer  considers  a  closed 
model  in  which  location  can  enter  into  utility  functions.  The  assumptions 
on  utility  functions  include  several  beyond  those  normally  used  in  general 
equilibrium  theory,  such  as utility  is  zero  if and  only  if  land  consumption 
is  zero.  These  assumptions  rule  out  many  standard  utilities,  violate  the 
conventional  boundary  condition  on  preferences,  and  do  not  reduce  to 
standard  assumptions  when  land  is  completely  homogeneous.  However, 
they  also  rule  out  the  examples  below.  Thus,  one  might  conjecture  that 
these  additional  requirements  are  weakly  necessary  for  the  existence  of 
equilibrium  or  perhaps  an  approximation  theorem. 
With  regard  to  models  of  product  differentiation,  by  interpreting  the 
location  attribute  of  urban  economics  as  a  general  hedonic  attribute  or 
quality  (see Lancaster  [ 183  or  Rosen  [26])  one  can  use  the  continuum 
model  detailed  below  as  a  model  of  product  differentiation  by  reinter- 
preting  the  variables.  This  model  is different  from,  say, those  of Mas-Cole11 
and  Jones  in  the  respect  that  consumers  are  restricted  to  the  ownership  of 
divisible  goods  in  one  location  or  of one  quality.  Many  other  location  or 
product  differentiation  models  focus  on  the  firm  or  supply  side  of  the 
market  (see, for  example,  Fujita  and  Thisse  [ 131 or  Novshek  [22]),  which 
is passive  in  the  model  discussed  below.  However,  if one  allows  consumers 
to  be  mobile  with  preferences  over  location  or  quality,  then  it  is very  likely 
that  the  examples  below  apply  even  with  an  active  supply  side  of  the 
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What  distinguishes  these  location  models  from  others  is  either  location 
in  the  utility  function  or  transportation  cost  (location  in  the  budget).  If  a 
model  has  neither,  then  land  can  be  modelled  as homogeneous.  Thus,  we 
concentrate  on  these  two  aspects  of  the  model.  Example  4  considers 
problems  that  arise  from  transportation  cost  even  without  location-depen- 
dent  utilities,  while  the  first  three  examples  consider  location-dependent 
utilities  without  transportation  cost.  We  note  that  transportation  cost  is 
much  more  common  in  these  models  than  location-dependent  utilities. 
In  general,  we expect  these examples  to  apply  in  any  model  where a con- 
tinuum  of consumers  is  mobile  and  restricted  to  choosing  one  commodity 
out  of  a  continuum.  The  intuition  of  this  is  not  hard  to  understand.  The 
equilibrium  price  or  rent  function  on  the  differentiated  commodity  is 
expected  to  do  too  much  in  the  location  model.  At  each  location,  it  must 
be  equal  to  the  marginal  rate  of substitution  between  land  and  numeraire. 
Furthermore,  it  must  prevent  the  movement  of  consumers  between  loca- 
tions.  Generally,  it  cannot  perform  both  functions  simultaneously.  In  the 
finite  model  of Berliant  [S,  61,  the  functions  collapse  into  one. 
We  refer  to  Manelli  [19]  for  another  context  in  which  economies  with 
a  continuum  of  consumers  differ  from  those  with  a  finite  number  of 
consumers.  Interesting  examples  using  a  classical  general  equilibrium 
framework  with  a  finite  number  of  commodities  are  presented  there. 
Relaxing  the  assumption  of  monotonic  preferences,  a  sequence  of  large 
finite  economies  converging  to  a  continuum  economy  is constructed  such 
that  there  are  core  allocations  that  are  not  approximately  decentralizable 
by  prices,  but  core  equivalence  holds  in  the  limiting  continuum  economy. 
From  this  one  can  conclude  not  only  that  monotonicity  has  a  different 
impact  in  the  large  finite  and  continuum  cases,  but  also  that  without 
monotonicity  a  crucial  link  between  a  sequence  of  large  finite  economies 
and  its  continuum  limit  is  broken. 
The  next  section  presents  the  models  of the  finite  economies  and  of the 
continuum  economies.  The  association  of a  particular  finite  model  with  a 
continuum  model  can  be  ambiguous.  Section  III  presents  a  discussion  of 
the  various  ways this  can  be done.  Section  IV  contains  the  examples,  while 
Section  V  concludes. 
II.  THE  MODELS 
Land  is  a  compact  set  in  a  Euclidean  space.  For  the  simplicity  of  the 
examples,  it  is  taken  to  be  a  one-dimensional  interval,  a  practice  common 
in  urban  economics  and  regional  science.  Without  loss  of  generality,  the 
interval  is  [ -  1, +  11. If  B  is a Lebesgue-measurable  subset  of [ -  1, 11, let 
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Central  Business  District  (CBD)  is  referenced,  the  definition  shall  be  the 
mid-point,  0. 
Following  Wheaton  [29],  the  continuum  economy  has  N  types  of con- 
sumers  (N  integer  and  finite)  indexed  by  i, j,  and  k.  Associated  with  type 
i is  an  interval  [0,  l]  of identical  consumers  of that  type.  The  location  of 
a consumer  is  indexed  by  r  E [ -  1, 11. Let  R +  be  the  non-negative  part  of 
the  real  line.  At  a  given  location,  a consumer  has  the  non-negative  orthant 
of lR*  (call  it  R:)  as the  consumption  set. The  two  goods  are  land,  which 
for  simplicity  of the  examples  is  assumed  to  be  homogeneous  across  loca- 
tions  except  for  the  locational  attribute,  and  a  composite  consumption 
good.  A  consumer  of type  i has  an  endowment  .ri >  0  of the  consumption 
good  but  no  land.  Let  the  quantity  of land  consumption  be given  by  h and 
the  quantity  of  composite  good  consumption  be  given  by  x.  For  a  gioen 
location  r,  preferences  of a type  i  consumer  are  given  by  a  quasi-concave, 
continuous  utility  function  ui(r,  h, x).  Quasi-concavity  in  r  is  not  assumed 
in  order  to  be  consistent  with  the  location  literature.  Note  that  agents  are 
endowed  with  (infinitesimal)  fractions  of income,  just  as they  will  consume 
fractions  of  land.  If  agents  were  endowed  with  positive  amounts,  the 
problems  in  Berliant  [6]  appear. 
We  now may  proceed  to  define  an  equilibrium  concept.  The  composite 
consumption  good  will  be  used  as numeraire  since  it  is  freely  mobile  and 
hence  has  the  same  price  at  all  locations.  To  be  determined  in  equilibrium 
are  a  rent  density,  p(r)  E L’(  [ -  1, l]),  giving  the  price  of  land  at  all 
locations;  hi(r),  xi(r)  E L’(  [ -  1, l]),  i =  1, .  .  .  . N,  giving  the  density 
consumptions  of land  and  composite  good,  respectively,  for  each  type  at 
each  location;  and  a  density  m,(r)  E L’(  [ -  1, 1  ] )  of  consumers  of  type  i 
residing  at  r.  It  is  assumed  that  all  consumers  of type  i at  distance  r  from 
the  city  center  consume  the  same  quantity  of land,  h,(r),  and  numeraire, 
xi(r).  Alternatively,  these  quantities  can  be  viewed  as the  average  holdings 
of such  consumers.  This  is  consistent  with  the  urban  economics  literature, 
e.g.,  Wheaton  [29].  Consumers  of type  i face  the  following  maximization 
problem: 
M;ximize  ui( r, h, x)  (1) 
subject  to p(r)h  +  x dyi.  (2) 
The  solutions  to  this  problem  are  called  continuum  economy  demand. 
Demand  can  be empty  if prices  are  discontinuous,  but  the  examples  below 
avoid  this  problem  and  display  nonempty  demand  at  equilibrum  prices. 
We  do  not  define  a feasible  allocation  for  the  reason  that  the  models  in 
the  literature  tend  to  be  open  rather  than  closed.  No  agent  explicitly  owns 
the  land  initially,  while  the  rents  paid  for  land  exit  the  system.  This  is  a CONTINUUM  LOCATION  MODELS  101 
valid  simplification,  since  it  is  easy  to  add  landlords,  one  at  each  point, 
who  own  all  land  initially  and  derive  utility  only  from  composite  good. 
In  fact,  this  closure  of  the  model  is  used  by  Fujita  [ 111  and  Berliant, 
Papageorgiou,  and  Wang  [7]  to  examine  the  welfare  theorems. 
A  continuum  economy  equilibrium  with  respect  to  endowments  { y,>r=  1 is 
a collection  of densities  p*,  (m:,  h,?, x,+);!  I  E L’  such  that: 
l  For  almost  every  rE  [ -  1, 11,  for  each  i  with  m,(r)>O,  r,  h,*(r), 
x*(r)  maximizes  (1)  subject  to  (2)  at  prices  p*. 
l  j’,  m:(r)=  1 for  all  i. 
l  For  almost  every  rE  [ -  1, 11,  C,“=  1 m:(r)hT(r)  d  1. 
The  first  condition  states  that  consumers  are  maximizing  subject  to  their 
budgets.  The  second  condition  states  that  all  consumers  are  located.  The 
final  condition  assumes  that  the  land  available  at  each  location  is one  unit, 
for  simplicity;  this  can  easily  be  modified  to  accommodate  2zr  as in  the 
plane-location  literature.  Since  m*(r)  is  population  density  and  h:(r)  is 
mean  land  density  with  respect  to  location,  their  product  is  equal  to  the 
land  density  demand  of type  i consumers,  so the  last  equilibrium  condition 
is the  land  market  clearance  requirement.  For  composite  good  endowments 
(y,),“,  ,,  the  set of equilibria  is  denoted  e(y,,  .  .  .  . yN). 
Several  aspects  of  this  continuum  model  deserve  discussion.  First,  for 
most  models  with  prices  in  L’,  prices  are  defined  only  almost  surely. 
Changing  the  prices  at  one  point  will  lead  to  an  “equivalent”  set of prices 
that  clear  markets  (almost  surely).  For  example,  the  model  with  a  finite 
number  of  consumers  detailed  below  has  this  property.  The  continuum 
model  above  does  not  have  this  property.  If  the  equilibrium  price  of land 
at  one  location  is changed  to  zero,  all  consumers  will  reside  there  (provided 
preferences  are  monotonic  in  land)  and  there  will  no  longer  be equilibrium. 
Thus,  there  seem  to  be  some  deep  measure-theoretic  problems  with  the 
model 
Second,  one  can  have  hi(r)  >  1 for  some  i and  r  in  equilibrium,  provided 
m,(r)  <  1. The  interpretation  of  this  inequality  is  unclear,  as it  seems  to 
suggest  that  average  or  per  capita  land  holdings  can  exceed  supply  at  r, 
even  on  a  set of positive  measure. 
Third,  it  is  standard  to  put  transportation  costs  into  this  model,  e.g., 
change  the  budget  constraint  to  x +p(r)h  +  Irl  <  yi.  Since  the  introduction 
of transportation  cost  results  in  a conceptual  problem  itself,  transportation 
cost  is  not  included  in  the  first  three  examples  but  is  considered  alone  in 
the  fourth  example.  It  is  out  hope  that  this  clarifies  the  exposition  below. 
Since  transportation  cost  appears  much  more  in  the  literature  than 
location-dependent  utilities,  from  the  standpoint  of  application  perhaps 
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Finally,  the  continuum  model  presented  above  suppresses  two  exter- 
nalities  that  appear  in  the  standard  models  of  urban  economics  and 
regional  science.  The  consumers  in  the  models  of  this  literature  take  the 
locations  of  each  other  into  account.  At  each  location,  the  population 
density  is  inverted  in  order  to  calculate  land  availability  (supply).  This  is 
the  amount  of  land  that  consumers  must  consume  at  any  location.  Thus, 
supply  enters  into  the  decision  problem  of the  consumers.  This  externality 
is essentially  a  reduced  form  feature  of the  equilibrium  equations,  and  we 
prefer  to  present  the  model  in  structural  form.  The  second  externality  is 
more  explicit  in  that  consumers  may  care  about  the  population 
surrounding  them  (see  Beckmann  [4]  or  ten  Raa  [24]).  In  this  case, 
the  global  population  distribution  is  assessed in  terms  of proximity  when 
social  interaction  is  a  good.  The  inclusion  of  such  an  externality  would 
complicate  the  model  and  examples  in  an  obvious  way  without  adding 
further  insights  to  the  relationship  with  the  finite  model. 
Turning  now to  the finite  economy,  there  are  N  consumers,  one  for  each 
type  of the  continuum  model.  Consumer  i is endowed  with  income  or  com- 
posite  good  yj~  [w  + ,  the  total  of  the  incomes  of  those  consumers  it 
represents.  The  consumption  set  of  each  consumer  is  93 x [w, ,  where  W 
represents  the  a-algebra  of measurable  subsets  of  [ -  1, 11.  Consumers  of 
the  finite  economy  actually  buy  subsets  of land  rather  than  densities,  and 
can  consume  composite  good  as well.  Preferences  are  represented  by  utility 
functions.  The  utility  function  of consumer  i  is a map  U, : W  x [w  +  -+  iw. We 
write  U,(B,  x)  for  a  parcel  BE  W  and  (residual)  composite  good  x E Iw  + . 
Prices  are,  once  again,  densities  in  L’.  Consumers  pay  the  integral  of the 
price  density  over  any  parcel  (see Berliant  and  ten  Raa  [S]).  For  given 
p E L’,  the  problem  of consumer  i is 
~mixi~e  Ui (B,  x)  (3) 
subject  to  1 
p(r)  dr  +  x byi.  (4) 
B 
The  solutions  to  this  problem  are  called  finite  economy  demand.  As  for 
continuum  economy  demand,  this  demand  can  also  be  empty.  If  utility  or 
preferences  are  continuous  with  respect  to  the  topology  specified  in 
Berliant  and  ten  Raa  [S],  demand  is nonempty.  We  assume  that  preferen- 
ces  are  strictly  monotonic  in  land,  i.e.,  if  B  is  contained  in  B’  and  B’ 
contains  positive  measure  not  in  B,  U,(B’,  x) >  U,(B,  x)  Vx,  Vi.  This 
assumption  is  made  for  convenience,  so  that  all  land  is  consumed  in 
equilibrium.  The  assumption  could  easily  be  dropped  and  the  definition  of 
equilibrium  altered  to  allow  idle  land,  but  at  the  expense  bf  complicating 
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A  finite  economy  equilibrium  is  a  price  system  p E L’  and 
(Bi,  xi);=  i E (g  x R,)”  such  that  (Bi,  xi)  maximizes  (3)  subject  to  (4)  for 
each  i and  (B, , B,,  .  .  .  . BN) partitions  [ -  1, 11. For  composite  good  endow- 
ments  (y,,  .  .  .  . y,,,),  the  set  of  equilibria  is  denoted  E(y,,  .  .  .  . yN).  More 
details  about  this  model  can  be found  in  Berliant  [6]. 
III.  THE  ASXXIATION  OF  MODELS 
The  data  of an  economy,  be it  modelled  in  the  finite  or  in  the  continuum 
mode,  consist  of  endowments  and  utility  functions.  A  finite  and  a  con- 
tinuum  model  represent  a common  economy  if endowments  are  equal  and 
utility  functions  equivalent.  We  cannot  require  equality  of  the  respective 
utility  functions,  simply  because  the  domains  differ.  In  the  finite  model, 
utility  is  defined  on  &?xR+  ; in  the  continuum  model,  utility  is  defined  on 
(C-l,llxR+bR+.  Land  enters  utility  through  a  parcel,  BE W,  in  the 
finite  case, and  through  a location-quantity  pair,  (r, h) E [ -  1, l]xR  + ,  in 
the  continuum  case. The  latter  approach  is more  restrictive,  since  location- 
quantity  features  are  also  captured  by commodities  BE $8, but  these parcels 
embody  other  qualities  as well  (such  as shape).  Thus,  in  studying  equiv- 
alent  utility  functions,  it  is  natural  to  start  with  a  continuum  economy 
utility  function,  U,  and  to  associate  a  finite  economy  utility  function,  U. 
Since  U  is  defined  on  a  much  larger  commodity  space,  the  extension  will 
not  be  unique. 
Fix  U: ([  -  1, l]  xR  + )xR  +  -+ 58. Take  a  commodity  of the  finite  model, 
(B, x) E gx[lB  + . The  question  is  how much  utility  must  be  associated  with 
it.  In  the  continuum  model,  a  consumer  is  represented  by  a mass  distribu- 
tion,  each  infinitesimal  particle  of  which  is  an  agent  who  consumes  den- 
sities  of land  and  numeraire  commodity  to  collect  a density  of utility  value. 
Now  the  very  concept  of  a  density  suggests  additivity.  Therefore,  it  is 
natural  to  distribute  the  mass  of  the  consumer,  1, and  the  numeraire,  x, 
across  the  parcel  under  consideration,  B;  evaluate  utility  densities  and 
integrate  them.  Let  the  consumer  and  numeraire  distributions  be  m and  z, 
respectively.  Assume  m(r)  and  z(r)  are  positive  only  if  r E B;  furthermore, 
fBm(r)  dr=  1  and  jBz(r)=x.  N ote  that  mean  numeraire  density  at  r  is 
z(r)/m(r),  mean  land  density  is  l/m(r),  mean  utility  density  is  u[r,  l/m(r), 
z(r)/m(r)],  and  utility  density  is u[r,  l/m(r),  z(r)/m(r)]m(r).  Hence,  parcel 
B carries  total  utility  Se u[r,  l/m(r),  z(r)/m(r)]m(r)  dr. It  remains  to  specify 
m(r)  and  z(r);  they  fix  total  utility,  U(B, x).  This  problem  is  analogous  to 
the  construction  of a  social  welfare  function.  We  consider  the  traditional 
constructs,  the  utilitarian  and  the  egalitarian  functions.  We  also  consider  a 
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which  individuals  are  forced  to  decentralize  their  pieces  and  consume 
Walrasian  allocations.  Since  we  construct  the  amount  of  utility  an 
individual  can  get  out  of  a  commodity  by  integration  of  utility  densities 
processed  by  fractions  of the  individual,  the  utilitarian  construct  seems  to 
be  the  appropriate  one.  Utilitarian  utility  is defined  by 
U(B,  x) =  sup i  u[lr,  l/m(r),  z~~)l~(~)lW)  dr 
m.z B 
subject  to 
J‘ 
m(r)  dr  =  1  and  s 
z(r)  dr  =  x. 
B  B 
Egalitarian  utility  is  defined  as the  solution  to  the  same  problem  but  with 
the  additional  constraint  that  mean  utility  density  is constant:  u[r,  l/m(r), 
z(r)/rrz(r)]  =constant  wherever  m(r)  >O.  Note  that  the  value  of  the 
egalitarian  utility  will  be  equal  to  the  constant,  since  the  total  consumer 
mass  is  one.  David  Pines’  market  utility  is  defined  to  be  the  equilibrium 
utility  level  that  is  obtained  by  the  continuum  economy  with  a single  type 
of consumer,  N  =  1, and  land  endowment  B  instead  of  [ -  1, 11. 
Note  also  that  when  the  utility  density  function  is linear  homogeneous  at 
each  location,  the  mass  density  cancels  and  total  utility  reduces  to 
U(B,  x)  =  sup 1  u[r,  1, z(r)]  dr 
;  B 




for  the  utilitarian  case.  In  this  case,  the  maximization  problem  fixes  the 
spatial  income  density  z, whereas  the  mass  density  m  can  be chosen  freely. 
In  particular,  it  can  be  chosen  to  equalize  mean  utility  across  locations. 
This  is an  example  in  which  the  utilitarian  and  egalitarian  utilities  coincide. 
Since  this  coincidence  will  also  hold  for  the  examples  in  the  next  section, 
the  ambiguity  of the  association  of continuum  and  finite  economy  models 
is  restricted.  By  separate  consideration  of  the  remaining  utility  construct, 
Pines’  market  function,  this  ambiguity  is not  used  as a source  for  examples 
of economies  that  are  not  weakly  similar. 
We  are  grateful  to  an  associate  editor  for  suggesting  an  interesting  inter- 
pretation  of the  egalitarian  link  that  is more  in  line  with  replication  models 
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finite  economies  contains  n  identical  individuals  of each  of  N  types.  The 
associate  editor  proposes  a link,  U,,  defined  by 
U,(B,  x)  =  max  n . u(r,  h, x) 
subject  to 
u(r,,  h,,  xl)=  ...  =4r,,  A,,, x,), 
x,+  .‘.  +x,=x, 
and  subject  to 
Cr, -  h,P,  rl  +  h,/2),  .  .  .  .  [r,  -  h,/2,  r,  +  hJ2)  partitions  B, 
and  where  n is integer  and  tends  to  infinity.  We  denote  the  limit  of the  U, 
as  bE.. 
In  order  to  fix  the  idea  of how this  link  and  the  egalitarian  utility  link 
are  related,  consider  the  case in  which  u(r,  h, x)  is  linear  homogeneous  in 
(h,  x)  (at  each  location  r).  Then  the  associate  editor’s  limit  U,,,  coincides 
with  our  egalitarian  utility  construct. 
To  see  this,  let  r;,  hj”,  x7  solve  the  associate  editor’s  maximization 
problem  for  U,  (j=  1, .  .  .  . n),  and  define  z,” =  xJ’/h.;.  By  the  constraints  of 
the  maximization  problem  and  linear  homogeneity, 
U,(B,  x)  =  i  u(r,“,  h,“,  x,“)  =  i  u(rJ,  1, zy)hJ  and 
j=l  j=  1 
f  z,”  . h;  =  x. 
j=  1 
Letting  n  tend  to  infinity,  this  is a  Riemann  approximation  of 
U(B,  x) =  j  u(r,  1, z(r))  dr, 
B 
where  jB  z(r)  dr  =  x,  U  is  the  egalitarian  utility  construct,  and  where  z( .)  is 
the  function  that  solves  the  defining  egalitarian  maximization  problem 
above.  That  is,  UA.E. =  lim,  _ o. U,  =  (1.  (More  precisely,  a limit  exists  and 
is  equal  to  U  by  Lebesgue’s  dominated  convergence  theorem,  or  U,.,  and 
U  are  both  undefined.) 
Turning  next  to  the  general  case, note  that  the  associate  editor’s  link  is 
specified  such  that  only  the  marginal  behavior  of u(r,  h,  x)  at  (h,  x)  =  (0,O) 
matters.  To  see this,  let  u(r,  0,O)  =  0 for  simplicity.  Then 
u,(B,  x)  =  i  u(rj”,  h,“,  z,”  ‘YJ  -  u(ry,  0,  0)  hT. 
j=l  J 
Define  u;  and  u;  to  be  the  partial  derivatives  of u with  respect  to  its  second 106  BERLIANT  AND  TEN  RAA 
and  third  arguments,  respectively.  Letting  n  tend  to  infinity,  this  is  a 
Riemann  approximation  of 
U(B,  X)  =  s  [uk(r,  0,O)  +  u;(r,  0, O)z(r)]  dr 
B 
4(r,  050) 
1  z(r)  =  .-  +  &(r,  0,O).  - 
m(r)  m(r)  I 
m(r)  dr 
=  J  [u;(r,  0, O)h(r)  -t  u;(r,  0, O)x(r)]m(r)  dr, 
B 
where  U  is  the  egalitarian  utility  construct  associated  with  i?(r,  h, x)  = 
u;(r,  0,O)  . h +  u;(r,  0,O)  .x  and  z( .)  and  m(  . ) =  l/h(  .)  are  the  functions 
that  solve  the  defining  egalitarian  maximization  problem.  That  is,  UA,E. = 
lim,  +  m  U,, =  U  based  on  ii,  through  the  egalitarian  utility  construct.  (The 
existence  disclaimer  of above  applies.) 
As  far  as  the  associate  editor’s  link  is  concerned,  any  u(r,  h, x)  is  trans- 
formed  to  the  linear  homogeneous  ii(r,  h, x)  =  u;(r,  0,O)h  +  u;(r,  0,0)x  for 
which  coincidence  of this  link  and  our  egalitarian  link  has been  established 
above.  TWO  important  problems  arise  in  this  general  case.  First,  the 
marginal  utilities  evaluated  at  (h, X) =  (0,O)  could  be  zero  or  infinite,  so 
that  Ez  is not  well-defined.  Such  is the  case if, for  example,  u(r,  h, x)  =  r  - 13.  x 
or  u( r, h, .x) =  h +  x1’*.  Second,  even  if  the  equilibria  of  the  continuum 
economy  with  utility  ii  and  the  finite  economy  with  utility  U,,,  are  close, 
the  equilibria  of the  continuum  model  with  utility  u  (the  economy  that  we 
are  trying  to  approximate  or  justify)  and  those  of the  finite  economy  with 
utility  U,,,  can be  vastly  different.  This  is because we have  transformed  the 
continuum  utility  u to  ~2,  which  can  exhibit  behavior  different  from  U. 
The  important  observation  to  make  is  that  if  the  associate  editor’s 
construction  is  used,  one  deals  with  equivalence  classes  of  continuum 
model  utility  functions  on  which  the  associate  editor’s  link  coincides 
with  our  egalitarian  utility  construct.  (An  equivalence  class  is  given  by 
those  continuum  utilities  u  that  generate  the  same  function  ii(r,  h, x) = 
u;(r,  0,O)h  +  u;(r,  0,0)x).)  For  the  link  proposed  by  the  associate  editor, 
only  the  marginal  or  linear  behavior  of  utility  around  zero  consumption 
levels  matters,  and  this  link  and  our  egalitarian  link  coincide  given  this 
condition. 
Still  other  possible  associations  of finite  to  continuum  models  are  con- 
ceivable.  However,  it  is  only  necessary  to  associate  a  finite  model  with  a 
given  continuum  model,  and  not  vice  versa,  since  we only  seek  to  try  to 
justify  a  continuum  model  by  generating  an  appropriate  finite  model.  The 
inverse  mapping  is  not  relevant  to  this  problem.  There  are  many  ways to 
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particular  association  was a  number  of factors.  First,  the  utilitarian  social 
welfare  function  is  used  frequently  in  the  urban  economics  literature  (see, 
for  example,  Mirrlees  [21]).  Second,  a discussion  with  Aumann  suggested 
that  he  intended  in  his  early  work  that  consumers  be  of arbitrarily  small 
but  positive  measure.  A  natural  way  to  take  such  limits  is  through  a 
utilitarian  welfare  function.  Third,  we feel,  as do  Papageorgiou  and  Pines 
[23],  that  our  association  is most  favorable  to  similarity  of the  continuum 
and  finite  models,  adding  strength  to  our  negative  results.  Finally,  we have 
also  considered  many  other  alternatives,  and  found  none  as appealing  as 
the  association  given  above. 
For  example,  one  can  use a “locator  function”  approach  to  association. 
To  be  precise,  let  continuum  model  utility  be given  by  u(r,  h, x).  If  BE  $8, 
we  may  define  U(B,  .~)=u(l(B),  IBI,  x),  where  1: B  +  [ -  1, 11.  Map  1 
locates  a  consumer  of the  finite  model  in  his  plot  of land,  and  is  called  a 
locator  function. 
This  approach  is quite  general,  and  does not  specify  a  particular  locator 
function  corresponding  to  any  given  utility  function  for  the  continuum 
model.  In  fact,  it  does  not  seem  possible  a  priori  to  distinguish  various 
locator  functions  from  one  another.  Nonetheless,  we have  found  that  the 
examples  generated  in  the  next  section  can  usualy  be  interpreted  or 
modified  so as to  apply  to  other  techniques  for  associating  models,  such  as 
the  locator  function  approach.  We  will  amplify  this  point  for  Example  1 
below. 
Clearly,  there  are  a large  number  of ways to  associate  finite  models  with 
continuum  models.  Of  course,  it  is  not  possible  to  show,  using  examples, 
that  there  is  no  way  to  associate  them  so  that  they  are  similar.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  not  obvious  that  proving  a general  theorem  is  worth  the 
trouble  and  complexity  that  it  would  involve.  This  belief  stems  from  our 
experience  that  the  locator  function  inducing  similarity  depends  on  the 
utility  function.  So,  once  the  locator  function  is  fixed,  alteration  of  the 
utility  function  will  produce  examples  of dissimilarity. 
IV.  EXAMPLES 
In  this  section,  we present  a number  of continuum  economies,  specified 
by  endowments  and  utility  functions,  and  their  associated  finite  economies. 
In  the  first  two  examples,  the  continuum  economy  equilibrium  exists  and 
is  unique,  but  the  finite  economy  has many  equilibria  (Example  1) or  none 
at  all  (Example  2).  As  noted  in  Gerber  [ 141  for  a  similar  (but  not  identi- 
cal)  finite  model,  each  linite  model  equilibrium  price  system  is  associated 
with  many  equilibrium  allocations.  In  Example  3, the  continuum  economy 
has no  equilibrium,  but  the  finite  economy  has one.  It  is artificial:  generally 
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equilibrium  in  the  underlying  continuum  economy.  Example  4  illustrates 
the  conceptual  diffkulty  encountered  when  transportation  cost  is  intro- 
duced  into  the  model. 
EXAMPLE  1.  For  the  first  example,  two  types  of  agents  have  utility 
functions  u,( r, h, x)  =  h +  x  and  z+(r,  h, x) =  Irl  h +  x,  respectively. 
Let  us  first  solve  for  the  continuum  model  equilibrium.  Type  1 agents 
maximize  h +  x  subject  to  p(r)h  +  x <  y,.  Being  indifferent  between  loca- 
tions,  they  consider  only  the  support  of the  minimum  of p(r).  If  the  mini- 
mum  price  is  less than  one,  pmi”  <  1, then  x =  0  and  J h(r)  dr  =  yl/pmi”  on 
the  support  of  the  minimum.  If  pmi”  >  1,  then  h =  0  and  x =y,.  In  the 
hairline  case  pmin =  1,  demand  is  multivalued  as  agents  are  indifferent 
between  land  and  numeraire  commodity.  To  type  2  agents,  the  marginal 
utility  of land  is  lower,  especially  towards  the  CBD.  Their  marginal  cost 
benefit  ratio  is p(r)/lrl.  If  the  minimum  value  of this  ratio  is  less than  one, 
then  x =  0  and  s h(r)  dr  =  yJ~(r)  on  the  support  of  the  minimum.  If  the 
minimum  value  exceeds  one,  then  h =  0  and  x =y2.  This  completes  the 
derivation  of  demand.  Note  that  wherever  p(r)  >  1,  demand  for  land  is 
zero,  which  falls  short  of supply.  Hence,  in  equilibrium,  p <  I.  Consider  a 
location,  r,  where  p(r)  =pmi”,  and  all  points  closer  to  the  center:  IsJ <  IrI. 
If  p(s)  >p(r),  then  no  type  1  agent  will  demand  land  at  s  and 
p(s)/ls]  >p(r)/lrl,  so  that  no  type  2  agent  will  demand  land  at  s  either. 
Hence,  p(s)  <p(r)  =p”‘“,  and  therefore  p(s)  =pmi”.  It  follows  that  in 
equilibrium,  p  is minimized  precisely  on  an  interval,  [  -  r*,  r*  ]  c  [  -  1, 11. 
Now  consider  the  other  points  s,  JsJ  >r*.  Since  no  type  1  agent  will 
demand  land  at  such  points  in  equilibrium,  this  land  must  be  demanded 
by  type  2  agents.  Hence  p(s)/lsl  must  be  minimal  at  any  s  of 
[ -  1, -r*]  u  [r*,  11,  and  p(s)  <  1.  Hence,  p(s)  =  (p”‘“/r*)  ($1,  1.~1  >  r*. 
The  coefficient  pmin/r*  is  pegged  by  the  continuity  of p.  (If  p  were discon- 
tinuous,  then  a jump  in  utility  levels  across  locations  would  be  possible, 
which  is not  true  in  equilibrium.)  Note  that  r*  =0  would  attract  all  type  1 
agents  and  yield  excess demand  at  0.  Hence,  equilibrium  prices  are  dish- 
shaped. 
It  remains  to  fix  r*  and  pm’“.  Note  that  type  1  agents  will  demand 
re  C-r*,  r*]  and  type  2  agents  will  demand  SE  C-1,  -r*]  u  [r*,  11. 
Also,  p mi” <r*,  for  if  1 2~“‘”  >  r*,  then  there  is  excess supply  of land  for 
1st sufficiently  close  to  1. If  pmi”  <  r*  =  1, there  is  excess demand  for  land 
at  r*.  Thus,  we have  pmi”  6  r*  <  1  but  not  pm’”  <  r*  =  1.  Distinguish  the 
three  remaining  cases: 
(A)  pmi”=  1 
(B)  P m’n<r*  <  1 
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(A)  pmi”  =  1. Since  in  equilibrium  p <  1, it  must  be  that  p =  1. Hence, 
r*  =  1. Type  1 agents  are indifferent  between  any  h(r)  and  x. Type  2 agents 
are indifferent  between  h( -r*),  h(r*)  and  x.  In  equilibrium,  almost  all  land 
is bought  by  type  1 agents.  Hence,  residual  income  amounts  to  x,  =y,  -  2, 
where  the  latter  component  is  the  value  of all  land.  Note  that  this  case is 
relevant  only  if y,  >, 2. 
(B)  pmi”  <r*  <  1. In  the  same  manner  as for  case A,  x,  =y,  -2pmi”r* 
and  x2 =yz  -  2 ji*  (p”‘“/r*)s  ds =y,  -  (pm’“/r*)(l  -  r*‘).  In  this  case, 
however,  the  marginal  cost  benefit  ratio  is  less  than  one,  so  that  agents 
want  to  spend  all  money  on  land:  x,  =  x2 =  0.  It  follows  that  2p”““r*  =  yI 
and  (p”‘“/r*)(l  -r**  =y2.  Consequently,  r*  =  (y,/(yr  +  2y2))“*  and 
P mi” =  (l/2)  Jm.  Note  that  this  case  is  relevant  only  if 
(l/2)  ,/m  <  (y,/(y2  +  2y2))“*  <  1;  that  is,  using  positivity  of the 
endowments,  y,  +  2y,  <  2. 
(Cl  P min =  r*  <  1. Type  1 agents  want  to  spend  all  their  money  on 
land:  2pminr*  =  y,.  Type  2  agents  are  indifferent  between  land  in 
[ -  1, -r*]  u  [r*,  l]  and  composite  good.  (p”‘“/r*)(  1 -  r*2)  <y,.  It 
follows  thatp”i”=r*=(y,/2)‘/2  and  1  -y,/2<y,  andy,<2. 
Taken  together,  the  equilibrium  price  is  as follows.  If y,  <  2 -  2y,,  then 
p is dish  shaped  with  r* =  ( yl/(  y,  +  2~~))“’  and  pmi”  =  (l/2)  ,/y,+2y,) 
(which  is  less  than  r*).  If  2 -2y,d  y,  ~2,  then  p  is  dish  shaped  with 
r*  =  pmin =  (~42)“~.  If  y,  3  2,  then  p =  1. 
Now  let  us turn  to  the  associated  finite  economy.  Since  utility  densities 
are linear  homogeneous  at  each  location,  the  simplified  expression  for  total 
utility,  be it  utilitarian  or  egalitarian,  from  the  last  section  is 
U,(B,  x) =sup  s  u[r,  1, z(r)]  dr 
z  B 
=  sup s  [ 1 +  z(r)]  dr 
2  B 
=  IBI  +s  z(r)dr 
B 
=  IBI +x 
and 
U2(B,x)=sup{  Clrl+z(r)ldr 
z  B 
=  Irldr+x. 
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It  is  not  difficult  to  verify  that  the  continuum  equilibrium  price  does 
clear  the  finite  economy.  This  is  essentially  due  to  the  absence  of income 
effects  at  every  location.  Therefore,  perfect  aggregation  conditions  are 
fulfilled  and  the  aggregate  consumers  are  representative  of the  infinitesimal 
agents  of  the  continuum  economy.  However,  there  are  many  more  equi- 
libria  of  the  finite  economy.  Any  rent  gradient  increasing  as  one  moves 
away  from  the  CBD  will  do.  For  example,  p(r)  =  \rl  clears  the  finite 
economy.  The  first  consumer  will  demand  C-r*,  r*]  since  any  point  yields 
more  benelit  than  cost,  where  r*  is as big  as the  budget  allows,  i.e., 
I 
‘*_  Irl  dr=y,,  or 
r*=&  ifPry,<  and  r*  =  1  otherwise. 
Consumer  2 is completely  indifferent  between  owning  land  at  any  location 
and  numeraire.  Hence,  he  can  choose  the  remainder  of land.  Notice  that 
both  the  equilibrium  price  and  allocation  can  differ  from  those  of  the 
continuum  economy. 
Under  the  locator  function  approach,  the  finite  economy  utilities  are 
and 
I4B)l  I4  +-x3 
respectively.  Assuming  that  f(B)  is continuous  with  respect  to  the  topology 
of  Berliant  and  ten  Raa  [S],  demand  is  nonempty  for  both  consumers.  If 
y,  <  2  but  close  to  2,  then  if  an  equilibrium  price  exists  for  the  finite 
economy,  it  is not  dish-shaped  as described  above  (case (C)).  For  if it  were 
dish-shaped,  then  consumers  of type  2,  who  occupy  the  outer  edges  of the 
dish,  can  increase  their  utility  by  buying  a  little  more  land.  All  that  is 
needed  for  this  is that  1 is  Lipschitz  in  a  weak  sense. Then  the  gain  in  IB( 
has  a  benefit  intensity  of  more  than  Y*,  which  equals  the  marginal  cost  in 
this  case (a  detailed  proof  is  available  from  the  authors). 
EXAMPLE  2.  Now  we will  present  a  continuum  economy  with  an  equi- 
librium  whose  price  does  not  clear  the  finite  economy.  Consider 
u(r,  h,  x)  =  Irl  +  fi. 
To  solve  for  equilibrium  in  the  continuum  economy,  consider  the  con- 
sumer’s  problem  of maximization  of  Irl  +  6  subject  to  p(r)h  +  x <  y.  At 
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quantity  of land  to  purchase:  h(r)  =  y/2p(r),  while  residual  income  is  spent 
on  numeraire.  Substituting  back  into  utility  we  obtain  the  utility  level 
jr1 +  (( y/2p(r))(  y/2))‘/*  =  Irl  +  y/(2  m).  In  equilibrium,  this  utility  level 
must  be  constant  across  locations:  Irl  +y/(2  m)  =  uO.  Consequently, 
the  equilibrium  price  is  p(r)  =  y*/4(u,  -  lrl )‘.  (The  constant  u,,  is  deter- 
mined  by  the  land  clearance  condition,  j  (l/h(r))  dr =  N,  where  N  is  the 
number  of consumers.  In  fact,  uO =  l/2  +  (y/N+  l/4)‘/*.) 
Turn  to  the  associated  finite  economy.  By  the  formula  of  Section  III 
(utilitarian)  utility  amounts  to 
W,  xl  =  SUP  j  4~7  l/m(r),  z(r)/m(r)lN-)  dr  m,; B 
subject  to 
i‘ 
m(r)  dr  =  1  and  i‘ 
z(r)  dr  =  x. 
B  B 
Hence, 
U(B,  x) =  sup { 
m,z  B 
[  lrl  +  (6  -$$)“*I  m(r)  dr 
I4 m(r)dr+[B,/%Idr] 
=  sup j 
m  B 
Id m(r)  dr + s;p  jB  Jzcr)  dr 
u* 
PI  = IIBII + JG, 
where  l(B(l =sup((rj  lro  B)  and,  as  before,  lB(  is  the  measure  of  B.  The 
limits  of m  and  z that  yield  the  supremum  value  for  the  last  two  terms  are 
the  density  of the  distribution  concentrated  on  sup B  or  inf B  and  the  con- 
stant,  x/lBI,  respectively.  Since  all  mass  of the  consumer  distribution  is con- 
centrated  on  a single  point,  this  utility  is also  egalitarian.  Clearly,  wherever 
price  is  locally  integrable,  all  consumers  will  demand  the  boundary  points 
+  1. This  is particularly  true  for  the  continuum  equilibrium  price.  Thus,  no 
equilibrium  exists  for  the  finite  economy.  The  reason  is  that  this  utility  is 
not  continuous  in  the  sense of Berliant  and  ten  Raa  [8]. 
EXAMPLE  3.  The  next  example  is  one  for  which  no  continuum  model 
equilibrium  exists,  but  when  the  associated  finite  model  is  formulated,  an 
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equilibrium  does  exist  for  it.  This  is  further  evidence  that  the  continuum 
model  cannot  be  approximated.  We  shall  discuss  the  implications  after 
presentation  of the  example.  Let 
U(Y, h, x)  =  h -  It.1  if  h<lrl 
and 
u(r,  h, x)  =  (1 -  Irl/h)x  otherwise 
u  is  continuous  in  all  of  its  arguments  and  concave  for  given  Y. It  also 
exhibits  local  nonsatiation,  but  is  not  monotonic.  Monotonicity  is inessen- 
tial  in  standard  general  equilibrium  analysis,  but  its  absence  does  harm 
existence  of equilibrium  for  the  continuum  model. 
Select  any  potential  equilibrium  price  system,  p(r).  For  each  r, 
distinguish  two  cases: 
(A)  p(r)  ~yllrl 
(B)  p(r)  <.v/lrl. 
In  case  (A),  since  the  budget  constraint  is  p(r)h  +x<y,  if  h >  It-1  then 
p(r)h  +  x>p(r)  Irl  +x  >y  (p(r)  =  0 is  clearly  not  part  of an  equilibrium), 
which  is  a  contradiction.  So  for  case  (A),  it  must  be  that  h 6  Irl.  In  this 
case,  the  utility  function  forces  agents  to  spend  all  on  land  (h),  so  that 
h=y/p(r)  and  x=0.  In  case  (B),  Irl  p(r)<y,  so  if  hbr,  then  hp(r)<y. 
Hence  some  income  is  spent  on  numeraire,  x>O.  This  is  not  rational  if 
h <  jrl,  so it  must  be  that  h >  Irl.  In  this  case, there  is  an  interior  solution 
obtained  from  the  first  order  conditions  and  the  budget  constraint: 
h=  Cl4 y/p(r)11’27  X=Y-  Cl4 p(r)yl”2. 
Note  that  demand  is continuous  even  at  p(r)  =  y/It-l.  An  equilibrium  condi- 
tion  is  that  the  utility  level  must  be  the  same,  say  uO,  across  inhabited 
locations,  for  otherwise  consumers  would  move.  Consider  first  case (A)  at 
some  location  r.  Then  h <  Irl  and  u,,=y/p(r)-  Irl  GO,  since  p(r)>y/lrl. 
If  case  (B)  holds  at  r,  then  h>  Irl  and  uO=  { 1 -  [lrl  p(r)/y]‘12}  . 
{y-  [jr!  p(r)y]“*)  =  (1 -  [jr1  p(r)/y]l’*)*y>O,  since  lrl  p(r)<y  in  this 
case.  Since  u0  is  a  constant,  it  must  be  that  either  case  (A)  holds 
everywhere  or  case  (B)  holds  everywhere.  If  case  (A)  holds  in  every 
inhabited  location,  then  consumers  can  always  move  to  r =  0  and  obtain 
strictly  positive  utility,  so the  original  allocation  was not  an  equilibrium.  If 
case (B)  holds  in  every  inhabited  location, 
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Solving, 
p(r)  =  (JJ2  -  U;‘2)2/lrl 
h(r)=  [lrl  y/p(r)]‘12=  Irl  y1’2/(y1’2-u~‘2). 
Given  that  m(r)h(r)  =  1 as.,  it  must  be  that 
i 
1  1 
e,~dr=J~lm(r)dr=N 
But 
(y1’2-u~‘2)/(y1/2  Irl)  dr. 
The  last  expression  is zero  if y =  u0 and  undefined  otherwise  as l/lrl  is not 
integrable  at  0.  In  either  case this  expression  is  not  equal  to  N>O.  Thus, 
there  is  no  equilibrium  for  the  continuum  economy. 
Turn  to  the  associated  finite  economy. 
U(B,  x) =  sup  (I  m.z  A* 
+  1  )  uCr,  l/m(r),  .4rY~(r)l~(r)  dr  B* 
subject  to  fBm(r)=  1  and  [,z(r)dr=x.  Here  A*=  {rEBlm(r)2  l/lrl} 
and  B*  =  {r E B 1  m(r)  <  l//r1  }.  Substituting  the  expression  for  U, 
U(B,  x)  =  sup  {jA*  [ --&  -  Id]  m(r)  dr + jBe Cl -  I4  m(r)l.dr)  dr}. 
m.; 
The  first  integrand  is nonpositive.  Hence 
U(B,x)GjBe  Cl-lrl  m(r)]z(r)dr<~~ez(r)dr<~~z(r)dr=x. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  write  down  U(B,  x)  precisely.  We  see straightaway 
that,  for  example,  p =  0  is  an  equilibrium.  Consumers’  demand  includes 
(0,  y)  since  its  utility  equals  the  previously  established  upper  bound. 
Supply  of land  also  includes  the  empty  set when  rent  is zero.  A  few remarks 
are  in  order.  Egalitarian  utility  does  not  always  exist  in  this  example.  Its 
existence  requires  that  B  is  contained  in  either  A*  or  B*,  so  it  is  not 
defined  for  all  B.  Pines’  utility  does  not  exist,  for  it  is  based  on  continuum 
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These  are indications  of the  difficulty  of associating  a finite  economy  that 
admits  an  equilibrium  with  a  continuum  economy  that  does  not.  In  fact, 
if  continuum  utility  is  assumed  continuous  and  monotone,  then  either 
the  associated  finite  economy  utility  function  is  discontinuous  in  the 
Berliant-ten  Raa  [S]  topology  or  always  infinite,  or  continuum  equi- 
librium  can  be  demonstrated  to  exist  by  Lebesgue’s  Monotone  Con- 
vergence  Theorem.  So continuity  and  monotonicity  render  the  construction 
of  an  example  without  a  continuum  equilibrium  but  with  a  finite  equi- 
librium  hopeless.  The  logical  negation  yields  a positive  statement:  If  a finite 
economy  with  a continuous  and  monotone  (density-based)  utility  function 
has an  equilibrium,  then  so does  the  underlying  continuum  economy.  This 
suggests  that  some  continuum  economy  equilibria  might  be  approximated 
by  finite  equilibria.  Example  4  shows,  however,  that  when  transportation 
cost  is  introduced  into  the  model  some  interesting  conceptual  problems 
arise. 
EXAMPLE  4.  So  far  we  have  seen  that  the  continuum  and  associated 
finite  models  can  be incompatible  by  lack  of existence  of equilibrium  in  one 
of  the  two  or  the  presence  of  many  more  equilibria  in  the  finite  models 
than  in  the  continuum  model.  The  next  example  shows that  the  existence 
issue is not  critical.  Here  we introduce  transportation  cost,  often  considered 
to  be  the  cornerstone  of  the  new  urban  economics,  into  a  model  with 
Cobb-Douglas  preferences  and  location-independent  utilities.  Consider 
u(r,  h, x)  =  h’  -a~CL  where  c1  E (0,  1)  is  a fixed  parameter.  It  is assumed  that 
all  consumers  must  commute  to  the  city  center,  perhaps  to  pick  up  their 
endowment  of  mobile  good.  Furthermore,  transportation  from  any  dis- 
tance  to  the  city  center,  Irl,  is  assumed  to  be  a  constant  marginal  cost 
industry  with  marginal  cost  of transporting  another  consumer  equal  to  /r/. 
This  implifies  calculations,  and  a perfectly  elastic  supply  curve  allows  us to 
ignore  profits,  as  there  are  none.  One  can  think  of  the  transport  supply 
sector  as being  driven  by  purely  physical  costs of supply.  Thus,  the  budget 
constraint  of a  consumer  locating  at  r  is  x +  p(r)h  G y -  jrl.  We  presume 
that  y $1. 
First,  we determine  the  equilibrium  price  and  densities  for  the  continuum 
economy.  Using  the  first  order  conditions  for  utility  maximization 
subject  to  the  budget  as  well  as  the  budget  constraint,  equilibrium 
numeraire  consumption  is  x(r)  =  cl(y -  Irl).  Using  the  equal  utility 
equilibrium  condition,  h(r)  =  z@’  -  “‘[a(  y -  Irl  )]  -?/(I  ~ n),  where  u,,  is  the 
equilibrium  level  of  utility  in  the  continuum  economy.  Integrating  the 
inverse  of  per  capita  land  consumption  and  setting  the  integral  equal 
to  Z?,  we  obtain  the  land  market  equilibrium  condition  uo= 
cP[2(1  -a)/N]‘-”  [y”(i-‘)-(y-  l)l/(lPrr)]l--a.  Next,  it  seems  necessary 
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[ti,  t2]  s  [0,  11, in  order  to  relate  this  to  a finite  model.  Thus,  we integrate 
J:; (r/h(r))  dr.  Aft er  some  calculations,  we obtain  total  transportation  cost 
(1 -  a)(a~/u,)‘/(’  -OL) 
1  [ 
E  (Y-~2)(2-~)i(l--z)_(Y_fl)(2-aa)/(l--cr)  1 
-[~*(y-~2)~l(f-~~-~l(y-~l)'l('--a)  II- 
If  [ti,  t,]  c  [ -  1, 0]  a  similar  expression  holds  by  symmetry  about  0.  If 
t,  <  0 <  t,,  total  transportation  cost  is obtained  by  adding  the  transporta- 
tion  costs of  [ti  , 0]  and  [0,  t2].  Although  the  expressions  are  complicated, 
we only  wish  to  make  the  point  now that  transportation  cost  on  an  interval 
depends  on  the  utility  functions  (though  a),  population  (N,  through  u,,), 
and  income  ( y),  all by  means  of  the equilibrium  conditions,  which  determine 
the  equilibrium  density  h(r).  If  there  were more  than  one  type  of consumer 
in  the  economy,  transportation  cost on  that  interval  would  also  depend  on 
which  type  lived  there  in  equilibrium,  as  the  type  would  play  a  role  in 
determining  the  equilibrium  population  density  in  the  interval. 
Turn  next  to  the  finite  economy.  We  are  primarily  concerned  here  with 
the  construction  of the  transportation  sector.  How  do  we build  a transpor- 
tation  technology  that  will  mimic  that  of the  continuum  model?  One  would 
expect  that  some  constant  marginal  cost  and  constant  returns  technology, 
such  as cost  jB  Irl  dr  for  parcel  B,  will  work.  The  reason  is  that  there  are 
no  profits  in  the  transportation  sector  of  the  continuum  model,  so  one 
would  not  expect  to  have  them  in  the  finite  model.  Giving  consumers 
income  as shareholders  would  only  complicate  matters. 
Of course,  such  a technology  does  not  generaly  work.  The  reason  is that 
transportation  cost  for  a  parcel  in  the  continuum  model  is  dependent  on 
equilibrium  conditions,  so that  the  appropriate  transport  cost  for  a parcel 
B  of  the  finite  model,  Se (Irl/h(r))  d r,  is  dependent  on  equilibrium  condi- 
tions  of the  continuum  model.  In  this  sense, this  approach  is  completely 
analogous  to  the  locator  function  approach  discussed  in  Section  II  and 
after  Example  1, and  must  be  rejected  for  the  same  reasons. 
It  is  important  to  be  precise  about  this  and  to  relate  these  ideas  to  the 
result  in  Papageorgiou  and  Pines  [23].  Suppose  that  there  are  two  types 
of  consumers  in  this  Cob&Douglas  economy  with  different  values  of  a. 
Then  on  any  set B  the  two  types  have  different  equilibrium  transportation 
costs  Se (b-l/h(r))  d  r,  where  h(r)  is  type-dependent.  There  are  two  ways to 
handle  transportation  cost  in  the  model.  If,  as in  Papageorgiou  and  Pines 
[23],  transportation  cost  is  embedded  into  the  utility  function  by  sub- 
tracting  it  from  the  endowment  of composite  good,  then  h(r)  is an  outcome 
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An  immediate  implication  is  that  the  previous  three  examples  involving 
location-dependent  utility  apply.  But  even  more  can  be  said.  Since 
equilibria  should  be  the  same  for  every  economy,  we can  set  N=  1 and 
compute  the  transportation  cost  in  the  continuum  equilibrium  on  an 
interval,  say  [ -  1, 11,  for  each  of  the  two  values  of  a.  Since  the  finite 
model  transportation  cost  must  be  equal  to  the  value  so  obtained  for  a 
particular  type,  each  type  of  consumer  faces  a  different  schedule  of 
transportation  costs  Se (It-l/h(r))  d r,  as each  type  spreads  itself  differently 
across  a given  parcel  B.  Hence  there  is price  discrimination  among  types  in 
this  “competitive”  model. 
The  second  way  to  handle  transportation  cost  is  to  make  it  explicit  in 
the  budget.  Then  the  schedule  of  transportation  cost  is  universal,  but  one 
must  know  which  type  resides  on  which  parcel  in  the  continuum  equi- 
librium  allocation  in  order  to  calculate  the  appropriate  h(r)  at  any  given  r. 
Hence,  the  equilibrium  allocation  of the  continuum  model  must  be known 
in  order  to  design  an  appropriate  transportation  cost  for  the  finite  model. 
When  there  is  only  one  type  of  consumer  in  the  economy,  the  price 
discrimination  that  occurs  when  transportation  cost  is embedded  in  utility 
is  trivial.  Furthermore,  it  is  known  which  type  resides  on  any  parcel  in 
equilibrium  (without  knowing  the  equilibrium). 
Given  the  data  (preferences,  endowments,  and  technology)  of  a  con- 
tinuum  model,  the  transportation  technology  cannot  be specified  as part  of 
the  data  of the  finite  economy  (such  as utilities  and  endowment),  but  must 
be  derived  from  the  continuum  model  equilibrium  conditions.  This  is 
different  from  the  specification  of the  finite  model  utility  and  endowment, 
which  can  be accomplished  as soon  as the  continuum  economy  utility  and 
endowment  are  known,  respectively.  If  we start  with  given  utilities  for  the 
continuum  economy  and  later  decide  to  change  income  (y)  or  utility 
function  (a)  in  order,  say, to  look  at  comparative  statics,  both  the  locator 
function  and  the  transportation  technology  must  be  changed  as well.  This 
change  has  little  to  do  with  finite  model  supply  or  demand  conditions  (as 
the  supply  curve  is  flat),  but  rather  with  the  underlying  technology.  It  is 
most  disturbing  when  one  is  trying  to  estimate  the  physical  cost  of 
commuting  in  either  mode  in  terms  of,  say,  gasoline  consumed.  Given 
a  constant  marginal  cost  technology,  why  should  the  cost  change  when 
utility,  population,  or  income  change?  This  almost  sounds  like  an 
externality. 
We  note  here  that  this  problem  persists  even  as N  becomes  large.  As N 
tends  to  infinity,  u,, tends  to  zero  and  transportaion  cost  on  any  interval 
tends  to  infinity.  The  same  changes  in,  say,  income  lead  to  larger  changes 
in  transportation  cost  as N  gets larger.  Thus,  letting  the  measure  of popula- 
tion  tend  to  infinity  does  not  solve  the  problem. 
A  couple  of final  remarks  about  this  example  are  in  order.  First,  this CONTINUUM  LOCATION  MODELS  117 
problem  arises  independent  of  the  aggregation  technique  used,  be  it 
utilitarian  or  egalitarian.  Second,  in  the  approximation  literature 
concerning  more  standard  economies,  once  one  specifies  the  data  of 
some  continuum  economy,  one  can  immediately  find  many  economies 
with  a large  but  finite  population  that  are  close  in  terms  of equilibria  and 
comparative  statics  to  the  given  continuum  economy.  Many  small 
perturbations  of parameters  will  suffice. Given  Example  4 above,  this  is not 
true  of the  standard  model  of urban  economics. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In  a series  of papers,  we have  seen  that  the  standard  continuum  model 
of spatial  economics  is flawed  because it  cannot  generally  be approximated 
by  finite  models,  and  because  equilibrium  may  fail  to  exist  or  the  welfare 
theorems  may  fail  even  under  standard  assumptions  of general  equilibrium 
analysis.  What  distinguishes  this  model  from  others  is  that  there  is  a 
continuum  of consumers,  each  of whom  must  choose  one  of the  continuum 
of  locations  (or  qualities)  at  which  to  consume  completely  diuisibZe 
commodities. 
The  major  difference  between  the  continuum  and  finite  models  is that  the 
marginal  utility  for  numeraire  depends  only  on  land  purchases  at  a  given 
location  for  the  continuum  model,  while  it  depends  on  land  purchases,  of 
fixed  quantity,  at  many  locations  for  the  finite  model.  Thus,  marginal  rates 
of substitution  for  the  two  models  are  not  necessarily  related.  Furthermore, 
the  aggregation  of  a  continuum  model  transportation  technology  into  a 
finite  model  technology  seems  difficult,  given  that  these  marginal  rates  of 
substitution  are  different  concepts  so that  transportation  cost  affects them 
in  different  ways. 
The  major  difference  between  this  type  of continuum  model  and  that  of 
Mas-Cole11  [20]  or  Jones  [16]  is that  the  consumption  set is  not  convex 
here  due  to  the  restriction  to  the  choice  of  exactly  one  location,  while 
commodities  are  divisible. 
There  are  several  other  ways of putting  this.  First,  as noted  in  the  Intro- 
duction,  utility  is  associated  with  location  as  well  as  the  other  goods. 
Hence,  equilibrium  prices  must  be  equal  to  the  marginal  rate  of substitu- 
tion  at  each  location  as well  as prevent  consumers  from  moving  between 
locations.  In  this  sense, there  are  not  enough  prices  or  incomplete  markets, 
since  location  itself  is  not  priced.  Even  with  transportation  cost,  it  might 
not  be  possible  to  price  location  separately  if,  say,  there  is  a  constant 
returns  to  scale  transportation  technology.  Moreover,  there  is  no  require- 
ment  that  utility  be  quasi-concave  in  location,  if this  is considered  to  be  a 
good,  and  so no  price  support  can  be expected.  If  location  simply  indexes 118  BERLIANT  AND  TEN  RAA 
goods  (in  this  case, h),  then  it  is  not  obvious  that  utility  can  be extended 
to  a  larger,  linear  space  (such  as  the  space  of  distributions)  in  a  quasi- 
concave  manner.  Furthermore,  the  equilibria  of  such  an  extended  model 
will  generally  involve  consumer  purchases  at  many  locations. 
One  point  that  this  discussion  brings  out  is the  difference  between  loca- 
tion  as a  commodity  in  itself  and  location  as an  attribute  of a commodity. 
For  the  differentiated  products  literature,  one  generally  leans  toward  the 
latter  interpretation,  but  this  is  not  entirely  obvious  if consumers  purchase 
goods  at  only  one  location.  Does  the  effect of location  stay  fixed  or  change 
as more  of the  differentiated  commodity  is  purchased?  With  regard  to  the 
spatial  or  location  theory  literature,  one  leans  toward  the  former  inter- 
pretation.  This  is  clear  from  the  additively  separable  form  of  utility  in 
location  and  land  (see Beckmann  [S]).  Presumably,  this  comes  from  the 
assumption  that  weather,  geography,  and  the  utility  cost  of travel  to  work 
have  a fixed  effect on  utility,  at  least  to  some  degree.  Is  location  a good  in 
such  models,  and  should  it  be  priced?  Even  if  a  transportation  cost  is 
present,  there  could  be insufficient  flexibility  in  its  pricing  to  price  location 
as well. 
Some  might  assert that  the  defects of the  continuum  model  outlined  here 
vanish  as population  (N)  gets  large.  We  note  that  Examples  2,  3,  and  4 
allow  arbitrary  IV. There  is an  explicit  discussion  of how the  defect  worsens 
as  population  expands  in  Example  4.  Furthermore,  the  main  point  of 
Berliant  [6]  is  that  land  consumption  necessarily  becomes  small  (on 
average)  in  the  finite  model  if population  becomes  large,  so that  large  finite 
economies  do  not  appear  to  approximate  reality  and  the  utility  of 
consumers  tends  to  zero  if  land  is  a  necessity.  Indeed,  if  we  allow  land 
consumption  to  tend  to  zero,  why  not  allow  consumption  of other  goods 
to  tend  to  zero  as well? 
We  wish  to  make  five  final  points  before  summarizing  the  main  message 
of  this  paper.  First,  the  problems  presented  here  arise  primarily  because 
transportation  cost  is  present  or  because  location  enters  explicitly  into 
consumers’  utility  functions.  Second,  it  is easy  to  close  both  the  finite  and 
continuum  models  while  retaining  the  results  by  using  landlords  who  own 
all  land  initially  but  desire  only  composite  consumption  good.  Third,  it 
does  not  matter  whether  the  point-by-point  or  aggregate  market  clearing 
condition  is used  for  land,  as the  examples  can  be modified  to  accept  either. 
Fourth,  the  examples  of  continuum  models  without  equilibrium  extend 
easily  to  a  finite  or  countable  number  of locations.  Fifth,  given  that  equi- 
librium  might  not  exist  in  the  continuum  model,  what  is  the  meaning  of 
comparative  statics? 
The  main  points  of this  paper  is  that  one  should  be  very  careful  when 
formulating  and  using  models  with  location.  The  intricabies  involved  in 
using  location  variables  seem  subtle  and  complex.  The  alternative  mode  of CONTINUUM  LOCATION  MODELS  119 
modeling  spatial  economies  developed  by  the  authors  in  separate  papers 
(Berliant  [S,  61  and  Berliant  and  ten  Raa  [S])  is  not  just  a  theoretical 
refinement  of  the  canonical  model  of  location  theory,  but  generates  dis- 
similar  equilibrium  results.  Thus,  it  might  be  said  that  the  two  modes  are 
qualitatively  different. 
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